ABSTRACT Remote user authentication without compromising user anonymity is an emerging area in the last few years. In this paper, we propose a new anonymity preserving mobile user authentication scheme for the global mobility networks (GLOMONETs). We also propose a new anonymity preserving group formation phase for roaming services in GLOMONETs that meets the extended anonymity requirement without compromising any standard security requirements. We provide the security analysis using the widely-accepted Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic and informal analysis for the proposed scheme to show that it is secure against possible well-known attacks, such as replay, man-in-the-middle, impersonation, privileged-insider, stolen smart card, ephemeral secret leakage, and password guessing attacks. In addition, the formal security verification with the help of the broadly accepted automated validation of internet security protocols and applications software simulation tool is tested on the proposed scheme and the simulation results confirm that the proposed scheme is safe. Moreover, the comparative study of the proposed scheme with other relevant schemes reveals that it performs well as compared to other techniques.
I. INTRODUCTION
Global mobility networks (GLOMONETs) provide the ubiquitous services for mobile users while enabling global roaming. Each user belongs to a specific home network (HA) where he/she is registered. When a user is in the domain of a foreign agent (FA), the FA needs to provide service only after authenticating the user (with HA's help). A remote user authentication scheme for GLOMONETs needs to validate that the user who attempts to access the services has rights to do the same. However, with the increasing concern for privacy and anonymity during the authentication it becomes a challenging task due to the high mobility of the users.
The primary challenge is to establish mutual authentication with a low computation and communication overhead in the context of GLOMONETs. The solution to this problem is non-trivial as the resultant scheme also needs to account for various security issues including but not limited to replay, man-in-the-middle, privileged-insider, impersonation, forgery and session key leakage attacks. It is also desirable that the designed scheme should be equipped to handle other issues like smart card loss and user de-registration.
In recent times, the question of right to privacy is a paramount concern with government agencies and privacy activists are actively involved in this process. Regardless, as part of the academic community, we have to acknowledge that if anonymity can be compromised with a simple court order it is not true anonymity. We present the following two scenarios. In the first scenario, a whistle-blower publishes an expose on some governmental malpractice using one of the many security measures available to obscure his/her identity. However, as he/she accesses the anonymity provider through his/her mobile service provider, the provider is aware of the fact that the traffic from a specific user is routed through anonymity service at the specific time. Even if the service provider does not want to expose the whistle-blower, the government can compel them with a court order. In the second scenario, suppose a laboratory has researchers with competing interests. The laboratory has sensitive resources (e.g., equipments and secure information) that can be remotely accessed only after the user is authenticated as an authorized researcher of the laboratory. Therefore, for security and transparency, it is imperative to maintain a log file of each authenticated access available to all authorized researcher of the laboratory. However, at the same time, due the nature of competing interests of the researchers, they should not be able to reconstruct the access history of a competing researcher.
In the first scenario, there is a question of anonymity as we have security against governmental retribution, while in the later case, it is a textbook case of breach of privacy. The similarities lie in the fact that in both the scenarios, the trusted service provider fails to provide the promised anonymity due to external factors. There is a distinct difference between anonymity and privacy. However, one of the means to ensure privacy is through anonymity. Another way to guarantee privacy is through a trusted entity (e.g., server and internet service provider (ISP)). It is customary to make assumptions of implicit trust towards the authentication server while designing an authentication protocol. Nevertheless, as discussed in the above scenarios, sometimes it is advantageous that the authentication server has some plausible deniability regarding its level of knowledge of the users of the system. Popular acceptance of technologies like onion routing [1] and its popular implementation, the TOR bundle [2] demonstrate the need of service provider independent anonymity. The fact that many current commercial VPN services advertise that they do not maintain any user logs which demonstrates the need of plausible dependability. In this paper, we propose a new anonymity-preserving authentication scheme for roaming services in GLOMONETs such that while authenticating, a roaming mobile user can choose to be anonymous even to his/her home agent (HA), and thus it allows the HA plausible deniability.
A. RELATED WORK
In this section, we give an overview of the existing relevant research work on the mobile user authentication in GLOMONETs.
In 1981, Lamport [3] proposed a scheme for remote user authentication over insecure communication channel. Hwang and Li [4] then identified that the password table used in Lamport's scheme is susceptible to verifier modification attacks. In 1999, Yang and Shieh [5] first proposed a smart card based remote that avoids a sensitive verification table to be stored at the server side. Later, several schemes have been proposed and improved by the researchers (for example, the schemes of Wu [6] , Tan and Zhu [7] and Chien et al. [8] ). However, most schemes proposed do not support mutual authentication between the user and the server. The schemes proposed by Ming and Hong [9] and Chien et al. [10] were among earliest schemes to support mutual authentication. But in these schemes, the identity of a user used in authenticating himself/herself can be exposed to any or all parties eavesdropping. The remote authentication schemes that obscure the user's identity from an adversary are considered to be anonymous remote authentication schemes.
Das et al. [11] first introduced the concept of dynamic ID for users of the system. Their scheme supports user chosen password that could be freely changed at any time. Chien and Chen [12] demonstrated that the dynamic ID can be directly associated with user's actual identity by simply monitoring plaintext variable in the login request message, thus compromising anonymity. Liao et al. [13] uncovered that [11] is vulnerable to guessing attack that exposes the user's password to the server and also fails to achieve mutual authentication. They then proposed a modified scheme to overcome the aforementioned drawbacks while retaining its strength of Das et al.'s scheme [11] . However, Yoon and Yoo [14] also demonstrated a reflection attack on the improved scheme of Liao et al. [13] that breaks the mutual authentication property.
Zhu and Ma [15] in 2004 proposed a scheme which uses a temporary ID to provide user anonymity. But, Lee et al. [16] discovered that the scheme described in [15] fails to achieve mutual authentication and it is also susceptible to forgery attacks. Wu et al. demonstrated both the schemes [15] , [16] fail to achieve user anonymity. They proposed a scheme to remedy the drawbacks found in [16] . Chang et al. [17] in 2009 presented an improvement to the scheme [16] as they demonstrated that the scheme [16] fails to provide anonymity when under an forgery attack. Chang et al.'s scheme is a lightweight authentication scheme as it only utilized bitwise exclusive (XOR) operation and one-way cryptographic hash function. Young et al. [18] cryptanalyzed Cheng et al.'s scheme and found that it fails to meet the security requirements.
In 2012, Madhusudan and Mittal [19] refined the criteria in earlier works [20] - [23] and proposed a set of security requirement and a set of desirable attributes for anonymous remote user authentication schemes. They reviewed several existing works [11] , [13] , [14] , [24] , [25] and observed none of the schemes meets all the stated criteria. In 2015, Wang et al. [26] argued that all the desirable attributes proposed in [19] cannot be simultaneously be satisfied as some of them contradict each other.
In 2014, Gope and Hwang [27] designed a mutual authenticated key agreement protocol. Later, in 2017, Madhusudhan and Suvidha [28] pointed out that Gope-Hwang's scheme is susceptible to replay, stolen smart card, offline password guessing and forgery attacks. In addition, their scheme does not preserve user anonymity. To remedy the security loopholes, they designed another user authentication protocol which can maintain the anonymity property in GLOMONETs.
In 2016, Arshad and Rasoolzadegan [29] analyzed the scheme of Karuppiah et al. [30] and showed that their scheme fails to protect off-line password-guessing attack and it does not also provide perfect forward secrecy property.
In 2012, Mun et al. [31] proposed a protocol to overcome the weaknesses of existing proposed protocols in GLOMONETs. Later, in Mun et al.'s scheme was shown to be insecure against masquerade as well as man-in-the-middle attacks by Lee et al. [32] in 2017. In addition, Lee et al. [32] pointed out that Mun et al.'s scheme does not preserve the anonymity and prefect forward secrecy properties.
In 2016, Xu and Wu [33] presented a three-factor user authenticated key agreement scheme in GLOMONETs. However, this scheme lacks supporting smart card re-issue phase. Also, Li et al. [34] proposed a user authentication protocol for GLOMONETs in smart city environment by enhancing the security of an existing user authentication scheme of Gope and Hwang [27] . Moreover, recently several other authentication schemes have been also proposed in the literature in GLOMONETs [35] - [39] .
Samarati and Sweeney [40] introduced the concept k-anonymity for protecting privacy in person specific data. The k-anonymity model was further refined into fore advanced models to provide differential privacy [41] , [42] . The k-anonymity property as introduced in [40] is that information about any individual in the released data should be indistinguishable from at least k − 1 individuals whose information also appears in the same data.
In this paper, we explore a more stringent privacy requirement and consequently adapt the desirable attributes proposed in [19] to account for privacy in form of k-anonymity. All the existing authentication schemes proposed earlier do not consider such property. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed scheme in this paper is the first one to consider the k-anonymity property for privacy in mobile user authentication in GLOMONETs. 
B. SECURITY AND FUNCTIONALITY REQUIREMENTS
While designing a user authentication protocol in GLOMONETs, several security and functionality requirements are necessary. Some security requirements are listed in Table 1 (as described in [19] ), while the functionality requirements are also listed in Table 2 . 
C. THREAT MODEL
It is assumed that any two parties in the network will communicate over insecure (public) channel using the broadlyaccepted Dolev-Yao threat (DY) model [43] . According to the DY model, an adversary A not only can eavesdrop the messages exchanged between the entities, but also can modify or delete the content of the messages or even can insert a fake message during the communication. Moreover, it is assumed that A can have a lost or stolen smart card of a legal registered user MU and can extract easily all the sensitive data contained in the memory of that smart card using the power analysis attacks [44] , [45] . As mentioned in [46] , the Canetti and Krawczyk's adversary model (CK-adversary model) [47] , [48] is the current de facto standard model in modeling authenticated key-exchange protocols. Under the CK-adversary model, A is not only responsible for delivering VOLUME 6, 2018 messages (as in the DY model), but also can subvert the private keys as well as the session keys and session states. Hence, it is essential that the security of an authenticated key-exchange protocol should assure that the leakage of some forms of secret credentials, such as session ephemeral secrets or session key, will have the minimum possible consequence on the security of other secret credentials of the communicating entities [49] .
D. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS
To the best of our knowledge, no existing mobile user authentication schemes in GLOMONETs provide anonymity from the HA's point of view. For plausible deniability of the HA, a more stringent privacy model is introduced in the paper. The enhanced privacy model has the following features:
• Anonymity and untraceability for mobile users against a third party observer (e.g., an adversary) as well as the FA.
• Optional k-anonymity for mobile users against their home agent (HA). The research contributions of this work are briefed below:
• The proposed authentication scheme allows authentication for both cases: 1) when the MU is in a foreign network and 2) when the MU is in his/her home network. The proposed scheme supports a group formation of n mobile users. In addition, the proposed scheme provides the integrity check of the group credentials, password update, smart card re-issue when the smart card of the MU is lost or compromised.
• With the help of the popular AVISPA tool the proposed scheme is tested for its security, and the the simulation results assume that no replay and man-in-the-middle attacks are found in the scheme.
• The proposed scheme is analyzed for its security using the BAN logic-based proof, and it proves that the proposed scheme provides mutual authentication between the communicating parties in the network. Apart from that, the proposed scheme is also shown to be secure against other possible known attacks using the informal security analysis.
• The proposed scheme also provides session key security, known as the SK-security, under the CK-adversary model. As a result, the proposed scheme also withstands the ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attack and provides forward secrecy property.
• The comparative analysis of the proposed scheme with the existing relevant schemes in GLOMONETs shows that the proposed scheme performs well as compared to those, specifically by providing better security and more functionality features.
E. ORGANIZATION
The basic mathematical preliminaries needed for discussion and analyzing the proposed scheme are given in Section II. In Section III, the detailed discussion on the proposed scheme is included. The extensive security analysis for various wellknown attacks on the proposed scheme is given in Section IV including the formal security verification of the scheme through simulation results in Section V. The performance comparison among the proposed scheme and other relevant schemes is provided in Section VI. The paper is then concluded with some remarks in Section VII.
II. MATHEMATICAL PRELIMINARIES
The necessary mathematical tools are discussed in this section in order to describe and analyze the proposed scheme and other existing schemes.
A. ELLIPTIC CURVE AND ITS PROPERTIES
Consider a set E p (a, b) of all solutions (x, y) ∈ Z p × Z p corresponding to a non-singular elliptic curve y 2 = x 3 + ax + b over a prime field GF(p), where p is prime, a ∈ Z p and b ∈ Z p are constants with fulfilling the condition 4a 3 + 27b 2 = 0 (mod p), and z p = {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}. Let O denote the the point at infinity or zero point in E p (a, b). Then, E p (a, b) constitutes an abelian group with respect to addition modulo p operation.
If P = (x P , y P ) and Q = (x Q , y Q ) be two points in E p (a, b), then R = (x R , y R ) = P + Q is computed by the following rule [50] :
The case P = Q is often referred as doubling the point and is represented as 2.P.
In ECC, the scalar multiplication of an elliptic curve point P ∈ E p (a, b) is denoted by k.P where k is a scalar, and it is achieved by using repeated point additions and doubling the point operations. For example, if P ∈ E p (a, b), then 23.P is computed as 23.P = 2.(2.(2.(2.P) + P) + P) + P using three point additions and four doubling the point operations.
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP): Given two points P, Q ∈ E p (a, b) where Q = kP and k ∈ Z * p is a scalar. Computing k from P and Q is computationally infeasible if p is sufficiently large (for example, p may be 160 bits prime). This problem is referred to as elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP).
B. COLLISION-RESISTANT ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTION
The one-way hash functions are extremely useful in securitysensitive applications, such as generating digital signature from original data to ensure integrity of data, message authentication code (MAC) along with general practical applications like computing checksum to ensure no data corruption during transmission, and fingerprinting of data in large tables to remove or normalize duplicate data. One of the most prominent properties of a cryptographic one-way hash function is that its message digests (outputs) are very sensitive to inputs even having small perturbations.
The formal definition of a one-way hash function h(·) along with collision-resistant property is given below [51] .
Definition 1: A collision-resistant one-way hash function h: {0, 1} * → {0, 1} n is a deterministic mathematical function that takes a variable length input and produces a fixed length output, say n bits. Let Adv HASH A (rt) denote the advantage of an adversary A in finding a hash collision. Then,
where the probability of a random event X is denoted by Pr[X ], and the pair (i 1 , i 2 ) ∈ R A indicates that the inputs i 1 and i 2 are randomly chosen by A. An ( , rt)-adversary A attacking the collision resistance of h(·) means that the runtime of A is at most rt and that Adv HASH (A) (rt) ≤ . An example of a secure collision-resistant hash function h(·) is Secure Hash Standard algorithm (SHA-1) [52] and its more secure version is SHA-256.
C. FUZZY EXTRACTOR FOR BIOMETRIC VERIFICATION
The fuzzy extractor is preferred in biometric verification applied in authentication schemes. A fuzzy extractor is defined as follows [53] .
Definition 2: A fuzzy extractor (M, m, l, t) consists of a pair of two procedures: 1) probabilistic generation function Gen(·) and 2) deterministic reproduction function Rep(·),
where M is a metric space with a distance function dist:
, m is the minimum entropy, l is the number of bits in the biometric key and t is the maximum error tolerance threshold value. The procedures Gen(·) and Rep(·) have the following properties:
• Gen(·) takes the user biometrics BIO MU ∈ M as input string and outputs a biometric secret key σ MU ∈ {0, 1} l and a public reproduction parameter τ MU .
• Rep(·) takes the noisy user biometrics BIO MU ∈ M and the public reproduction parameter τ MU corresponding to BIO MU ∈ M as inputs, and then reconstructs the biometric secret key σ MU provided that the Hamming distance dist(BIO MU , BIO MU ) ≤ t. In other words,
gives the Hamming distance between two biometrics with dist(x, y) = 0 if and only if x = y, and it obeys symmetric property:
The fuzzy extractor (M, m, l, t) is called efficient if both the Gen(·) and Rep(·) procedures are executed in polynomial time [54] .
III. THE PROPOSED AUTHENTICATION SCHEME
A new mobile user authenticated key agreement scheme has been proposed in this section which preserves the anonymity property in GLOMENETs. The scheme is divided into six main phases: • Login and authentication phase • Group formation phase • Session key update phase • Maintenance phase The detailed description of each phase is provided in the following subsections.
A. SETUP PHASE
This phase is executed in the offline mode by the trusted authority (TA). During the setup phase, the TA chooses a nonsingular elliptic curve E p (a, b) over a prime finite field GP(p) with a generator G such that the ECDLP becomes intractable with a sufficiently large prime p. After that a cryptographic one-way hash function h(·), probabilistic generation Gen(·) function and deterministic reproduction function Rep(·) for a fuzzy extractor to perform biometric verification, and symmetric cryptosystem are selected by the TA.
After Figure 1 summarizes the registration of a mobile user MU with his/her home agent (HA). Note that the necessity of sending PPW during this registration phase by MU to the HA is to re-issue a new smart card and invalidate the old smart card in case of a loss of smart card or if MU suspects that his/her smart card has been compromised. This is performed during the smart card re-issue phase as discussed in Section III-F3.
C. LOGIN AND AUTHENTICATION PHASE
During this phase the mobile user first logins into the network using his/her identity, password and biometrics. The user credential is verified by the smart card. Once the user is verified, through the following steps the MU establishes a session key with the HA or FA depending on the following circumstances.
1) MU IS NOT IN HIS/HER HOME NETWORK
The following steps are executed during this phase: A1: MU provides his/her identity ID MU Figure 2 summarizes the login and authentication handshake when the user needs to access the services through a foreign agent.
Remark 1: To strengthen the replay attack protection, the following strategy can be adopted [55] . The FA can store the tuple (EIDx, A) in its database. When the next login request message, say M 1 = {A , SPWx , EIDx , ID HA , Q x }, the FA checks if EIDx matches with EIDx and also the corresponding A with A. If both checks are valid, it assures that M 1 is a replayed message. Otherwise, the FA will add the tuple (EIDx , A ) in its database. In a similar way, the HA can also store the tuple (EID x , Q y ) in its database. When the next message M 2 = {A , EIDx , Q x , EY , ID FA } is received, the HA will compute Q y = D[EY ] K FAHA and checks if Q y = Q y . If it holds, M 2 is also treated as a replay message. Note that these tuples need to be kept in the databases of the FA and the HA for a longer time to provide strong replay attack protection.
2) MU IS IN HIS/HER HOME NETWORK
If the MU is located in his/her home network, the mechanism to establish the session key with the HA is executed using the following steps: Figure 3 summarizes the authentication procedure when MU is located in his/her home network.
D. GROUP FORMATION PHASE
In this section, we discuss the group formation procedure where a registered MU can request the HA for group VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 2. Summary of authentication when MU is in a foreign network.
credentials. The HA initiates and controls the group formation. An k-anonymous user group can be formed through execution of the following steps. The main purpose of the group formation in the proposed scheme is as follows. When a mobile user MU visits a foreign agent (FA), he/she is always traceable by the HA. However, if the MU utilizes its group credentials for authentication purpose, he/she will remain untraceable by the HA. Figure 4 summarizes the formation of a group with n members. It is also worth noticing from this figure that the number of steps towards successful group formation is linearly proportional to the number of group members.
E. SESSION KEY UPDATE PHASE
In this phase, a mobile user MU and the HA/FA negotiate a new session key by leveraging the old session key. The steps to update the session key are given below: U1: MU generates a random number k x i+1 and calculates 
MU attempts to decrypt cert with SK i+1 and if the result is equal to h(Q y i+1 ), MU sets the updated session key SK i+1 with SK i+1 . Figure 5 summarizes the session key update mechanism.
F. MAINTENANCE PHASE
This phase describes the mechanisms for integrity check for the group credentials, password update and smart card reissue phases. 
1) INTEGRITY CHECK FOR GROUP CREDENTIALS
As the group members are anonymous, in order to ensure that no one abuses the group credentials, its integrity needs to be verified regularly. However, this integrity check should not compromise the anonymity of the group members. A procedure that meets such a requirement is presented through the execution of the following steps: C1: The HA requests all n group members to send the counts of their successful logins. This phase is finally briefed in Figure 6 .
2) PASSWORD UPDATE
For security reasons, it is a better practice to change the password of any legal registered user MU at any time. MU then adds τ MU , r * and count to the smart card. Finally, the new smart card contains the credentials Fig. 7 , the smart card re-issue process is summarized. It is to be noted that in case of smart card loss, the user loses the privilege to access services as a anonymous member of any group he/she was part of. However, the group is not compromised and if the group was formed with n members, it will currently have n − 1 active members.
Remark 2: In case of a smart card loss, the anonymous group is only functional until the next integrity check when the group will be dissolved. This inconvenience can be avoided by appending E[count] k MU to the login request message M 1 in the login and authentication phase, and storing it in the database of the HA.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, through both the widely accepted BurrowsAbadi-Needham logic (BAN Logic) proof [56] and informal security analysis, we show that the proposed scheme can withstand various known attacks.
A. MUTUAL AUTHENTICATION THROUGH BAN LOGIC
Using the BAN Logic [56] , we show that the proposed scheme provides mutual authentication between a legal registered mobile user MU and the FA in presence of the HA.
The notations used in the BAN logic are as follows:
• P |≡ X : Principal P believes a statement X , or P is entitled to believe X .
• #(X ): Formula X is considered fresh.
• P ⇒ X : P has jurisdiction over a statement X .
• P X : P sees X .
• P |∼ X : P once said X .
• (X , Y ): Formula X or Y is one part of formula (X , Y ).
• {X } K : X is encrypted using the key K .
• X Y : X combined with Y .
• P K ←→ Q: P and Q may use the shared key K to communicate. K is good in that it will never be discovered by any principal except P and Q.
• P X Q: X is secret that is known only to P and Q, and possibly to principals trusted by them. The BAN logic is governed by the following four rules: 
Rule(2) [Nonce-verification rule]:
P|≡#(X ),P|≡Q|∼X P|≡Q|≡X .
Rule(3) [Jurisdiction rule]:
P|≡Q ⇒X ,P|≡Q|≡X P|≡X .
Rule(4) [Freshness-conjuncatenation rule]:

P|≡#(X )
P|≡#(X ,Y ) .
We now prove the mutual authentication between MU and the FA with the help of the HA in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1: The proposed scheme provides secure mutual authentication between a legal registered mobile user MU and the FA with the help of the HA during the login and authentication phase of the proposed scheme.
Proof 1: According to the analytic procedures of the BAN logic, the following goals need to be satisfied to prove mutual authentication between MU and FA with the help of HA:
The generic forms of the proposed scheme during the login and authentication phase (discussed in Section III-C1) are provided below: From H 5 : and the fact that K yHA is derived from Q y , we have the following results: (4), and the fact that K yHA is derived from Q y , we have:
From M 3 :, we obtain, The goals G 1 -G 3 assure that both the participants MU and the FA mutually authenticate each other with the help of the HA.
B. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS
Through informal (non-mathematical) security analysis, we also show that the proposed scheme is resilient against known attacks that are proved in the following propositions. Proposition 1: Both the user anonymity and untracebility properties are preserved in the proposed scheme. Thus, identifying or even differentiating between different MU s is difficult for an adversary. EIDx on the other hand is encrypted with the key K xHA which is shared only between MU and the HA. If EIDx is decrypted, it can be used to identify MU , but neither an adversary nor the FA can decrypt EIDx without having the key K xHA . Furthermore, if MU uses group credentials, the HA only knows that the user MU belongs to the anonymous group with identity ID MU (or ID GR in this case). The similar situation happens for the transmitted messages during the login and authentication phase when MU is in his/her home network. Thus, MU remains also anonymous even to the HA. Hence, it ensures the user anonymity property.
It is also worth noticing that during the login and authentication phase when MU is not in his/her home network the messages
authToken] K yHA } and M 4 = {EYh, cert} are all dynamic in nature for each session as these messages involve the random nonces. In a similar way, during the login and authentication phase when MU is in his/her home network, the transmitted messages are also dynamic in nature. Due to the dynamic construction of the messages, an adversary could not be able to trace the same user over different sessions even if the same user authenticates with the FA with the help of the HA or directly with the HA. As a result, the proposed scheme is able to preserve untraceability property.
Proposition 2: The proposed scheme is resilient against impersonation attacks.
Proof 3: The proposed scheme can effectively thwart impersonation attacks in the following scenarios:
• An adversary A cannot impersonate MU to cheat the HA as regardless of whether MU is located in his/her home network or not, his/her identity is verified by the value A = h(K MUHA Q x ) and K MUHA is only shared between MU and HA.
• A cannot impersonate MU to cheat the FA as the FA verifies the identity of MU by matching SPWx received from MU with the SPWx received from the HA.
• A cannot impersonate the FA to cheat the HA as EY is encrypted by the secret K FAHA that is shared only between the FA and the HA.
• A cannot impersonate the FA to cheat MU as MU is assured of the FA's authenticity by the message M 4 which is sent by FA but it is encrypted with the secret K xHA which is the key shared between MU and the HA.
• A cannot also impersonate HA to cheat the FA or MU as through the messages M 3 and M 4 , which are encrypted with keys K yHA and K xHA , respectively, are unknown to A.
Considering all the above scenarios, it is derived that the proposed scheme resists the impersonation attacks.
Proposition 3:
The proposed scheme is resilient against replay attack.
Proof 4: An adversary A can replay the message M 1 = {A, SPWx, EIDx, ID HA , Q x } as the login request of a valid user MU to FA and receive the replay message M 4 = {EYh, cert} during the login and authentication phase when MU is not in his/her home network (Section III-C1). However, A, lacking access to the key K xHA , can neither decrypt EYh nor calculate the session key SK xy = h(k y · Q x ) ⊕authToken. Furthermore, the FA or HA can easily detect the replayed messages by comparing the transmitted Q x with previously received Q x . In addition, the strategy adopted in Remark 1 also prevents A to perform the replay attack easily on the proposed scheme. The similar situation happens for the login and authentication phase when MU is in his/her home network (Section III-C2). Hence, the proposed scheme resists the replay attack.
Proposition 4:
The proposed scheme withstands the manin-the-middle attack.
Proof 5: In a man-in-the-middle attack, an adversary A intercepts the transmitted messages and tries to modify the messages in such a way that they are not detected by the respective recipients. In the proposed scheme, assume that A wishes to modify the messages M 1 , M 2 , M 3 and M 4 during the login and authentication phase when MU is not in his/her home network. To modify the message M 1 = {A, SPWx, EIDx, ID HA , Q x }, A needs to generate a random number k x and calculate
Note that it is a computationally infeasible task for A to compute A and SPWx without having the secret credentials K MUHA , SPW and ID MU . Thus, A will not be able to send the modified message M 1 successfully to the FA. In a similar way, A can not also modify other messages M 2 , M 3 and M 4 as these messages also need the secret credentials. The same argument is valid for the intercepted messages M 1 and M 2 during the login and authentication phase when MU is in his/her home network. Hence, the man-in-the-middle attack is prevented in the proposed scheme.
Proposition 5: The proposed scheme is secure against ephemeral secret leakage (ESL) attack.
Proof 6: We consider the CK-adversary model [47] , [48] (as discussed in the threat model in Section I-C) for analysis of ESL attack. In the proposed scheme, the session key is constructed by a legal registered mobile user and the FA during the the login and authentication phase when MU is not in his/her home network is computed as
It is then clear that the session key is composed of both the session-temporary information k x and k y as well as long-term secret ID MU and K MUHA . Thus, the session key can be revealed if an adversary A is able to compromise both the session-temporary and long-term secrets. Again, since the random numbers k x and k y are used in construction of the session keys between MU and the FA in different sessions, if a session key is revealed in a particular session it does not lead to compute the other session keys in other sessions due to involvement of longterm secrets. Similarly, A will not be able to compromise the session keys between MU and the HA during the the login and authentication phase when MU is in his/her home network. Hence, the session-temporary information attack is protected in the proposed scheme and it also provides perfect forward secrecy. As a result, the session key security is preserved and hence, the proposed scheme is also secure against ESL attack.
Proposition 6: The proposed scheme is resilient against the offline password guessing attack through the smart card stolen attack.
Proof 7: Assume that an adversary A extracts all the information {SPW , EID, Q HA , ID HA , G, h(·), , τ MU , r , count} stored in the stolen/lost smart card using the power analysis attacks [44] , [45] (described in the threat model in Section I-C), where
To guess properly the correct password PW MU from r , the secret credentials, such as the biometric key σ MU and the identity ID MU of MU are necessary to A apart from random secret r. Also, to derive ID MU from SPW and EID, A requires the secret key K MUHA . Consequently, it is a computationally infeasible task for guess correctly PW MU as it needs simultaneously guessing another secret credentials K MUHA , ID MU and σ MU . Hence, the proposed scheme is secure against the offline password guessing attack.
Proposition 7:
The proposed scheme is resilient against privileged-insider attack.
Proof 8: Though the HA or the TA is trusted entity in the network, a privileged-insider user of that entity may act an insider attacker, say A. At the user registration time, assume that A has the registration information ID MU , Q MU , PPW , where k MU = PW MU ⊕ r, Q MU = k MU · G and PPW = h(PW MU ID MU σ MU ). In addition, we also assume that the smart card of MU is attained by A after the registration process is completed. So, A will have the information {SPW , EID, Q HA , ID HA , G, h(·), , τ MU , r , count} stored in the stolen/lost smart card. Then, guessing correct password PW MU from PPW needs the biometric key σ MU . To derive the random secret r from r , A needs σ MU . Hence, without r, it is computationally infeasible task to verify the correct guessed password PW MU of MU . Also, deriving k MU = PW MU ⊕ r from Q MU = k MU · G is computational infeasible due to hardness of solving ECDLP (defined in Section II-A). Consequently, the proposed scheme is secure against privilegedinsider attack.
Proposition 8: The proposed anonymous group does not compromise the security of the proposed scheme.
Proof 9: The anonymous group, when is used, disallows verification of individual identity. We individually discuss the following cases:
• MU , who has been de-registered, can attempt to access service with group credentials. However, the group credentials are refreshed periodically as well as in event of member de-registration.
• An adversary A can attempt to impersonate the valid group members. Only valid group members have access to group credentials. Even if the smart card is compromised, the sensitive information is encrypted with k MU .
• A valid group member can voluntarily share the group credentials with A. In this scenario, A can successfully impersonate an anonymous group member, but only until the integrity of the group is verified. A valid group member will have no motivation to co-operate with A. Considering the above cases, it is inferred that an anonymous group does not compromise the security of the proposed scheme.
V. FORMAL SECURITY VERIFICATION THROUGH AVISPA TOOL: SIMULATION STUDY
In this section, the proposed scheme is simulated using the AVISPA tool, a widely-accepted tool for the formal security verification. This section demonstrates how the replay and man-in-the-middle attacks against an adversary are protected in the proposed scheme.
AVISPA is an automated validation tool with a high-level language specification for the security sensitive applications and protocols [57] . In recent years, AVISPA becomes a popular and powerful tool for the formal security verification [58] - [64] . The architecture of the AVISPA tool is shown in Figure 8 . AVISPA provides various automatic analysis techniques through its four back-ends: 1) On-the-fly Model-Checker (OFMC), 2) Constraint Logic based Attack Searcher (CL-AtSe), 3) SAT-based Model-Checker (SATMC) and 4) Tree Automata based on Automatic Approximations for the Analysis of Security Protocols (TA4SP). More detailed descriptions on these back-ends can be found in [57] .
The security protocols which are to be analyzed for their security part by AVISPA tool need to be implemented in HLPSL (High Level Protocols Specification Language) [65] . HLPSL is a role based language and contains the following roles [57] , [65] :
• Basic roles: These roles, in general, represent different participating entities in the protocol.
• Composition roles: These roles represent different scenarios involving basic roles. In HLPSL, an intruder is represented as one of the basic legitimate roles and is always represented by i. The HLPSL specification of the protocol is translated to its intermediate format (IF) using the HLPSL2IF translator, and then IF is converted to output format (OF) by one of the four back-ends. The OF typically has the following sections [65] :
• SUMMARY: It defines whether the tested protocol is safe, unsafe, or whether the analysis is inconclusive.
• DETAILS: It states a detailed explanation of why the tested protocol is concluded as safe, or under what conditions the test application or protocol is exploitable using an attack, or why the analysis is inconclusive.
• PROTOCOL: It defines the HLPSL specification of the target protocol in intermediate form.
• GOAL: The goal of the analysis which is being performed by AVISPA using HLPSL specification.
• BACKEND: The name of the back-end that is used for the analysis, that is, one of OFMC, CL-AtSe, SATMC and TA4SP.
• Finally, the trace of a possible vulnerability to the target protocol, if any, along with some useful statistics and relevant comments. Various basic roles for a mobile user MU ), the foreign agent (FA) and the home agent (HA) have been implemented in HLPSL for the proposed scheme. Apart from these roles, the roles for the session, goal and environment for the proposed scheme have been also implemented in HLPSL. For this purpose, the following three cases are considered in implementation:
• Case 1. It simulates the registration phase followed by the login and authentication phase when a mobile user MU is not in his/her home network.
• Case 2. It simulates the registration phase followed by the login and authentication phase when a mobile user MU is in his/her home network.
• Case 3. It simulates the registration phase followed by the group formation phase. The proposed scheme is simulated for all the cases 1, 2 and 3 under the two broadly-used back-ends, namely OFMC and CL-AtSe, using the SPAN, the Security Protocol ANimator for AVISPA tool [66] . It is worth noticing that the proposed scheme uses the bitwise XOR operations for the cases 1, 2 and 3. At present, other backends, namely SATMC and TA4SP do not support this feature of implementing XOR operations in the roles. As a result, the simulation results of the proposed scheme for all three cases using SATMC and TA4SP backends come as ''inconclusive'', and hence, we have ignored these results in this paper. The following verifications are essential: • Executability check on non-trivial HLPSL specifications: Due to some modeling mistakes, a protocol can not sometimes execute to completion. Hence, it may be possible that the AVISPA backends will not be able to find an attack, if the protocol model can not reach to a state where an attack can take place. An executability test is then extremely important [65] .
• Replay attack check: For this check, the OFMC and Cl-AtSe back-ends check whether the legitimate agents can execute the specified protocol by performing a search of a passive intruder. In this case, the backends supply the intruder the knowledge of some normal sessions between the legitimate agents. The simulation results shown in Figures 9, 10 and 11 indicate that the proposed scheme is secure against the replay attack.
• Dolev-Yao model check: For such a check, the OFMC and Cl-AtSe back-ends also check if any man-inthe-middle attack is possible by an intruder. It is also evident from the simulation results reported in Figures 9, 10 and 11 that the proposed scheme consummates the design goals and it is secure against man-inthe-middle attack under OFMC and Cl-AtSe backends.
VI. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
In this section, we compare the merits of the proposed scheme with respect to other existing related schemes, such as the schemes of Arshad and Rasoolzadegan [29] , Xu and Wu [33] , Lee et al. [32] , Memon et al. [67] , Zhao et al. [68] and Mun et al. [31] . Table 4 shows the computation costs comparison among the proposed scheme and other schemes during the login & authentication and session key agreement phases for MU , HA and FA. For comparison of computation costs among costs, we apply the following notations provided in Table 5 along with their rough estimated computation time in milliseconds. We have used the existing experimental results reported in [69] and [70] . From Table 4 , it is noted that the proposed scheme requires more computation cost as compared to some existing schemes. This is justified because the proposed scheme applies the biometric verification using the fuzzy extractor technique for the mobile user login and authentication and the proposed scheme also offers better security and functionality features as compared to other existing schemes (see Table 7 ).
In Table 6 , we tabulate the communication costs for the authentication and key establishment phase for the proposed scheme and other existing schemes. The bit-length of different parameters are taken as follows: ID x : 160 bits, random number: 160 bits; x.P (ECC point (x P , y P )): 320 bits (assuming 160-bit ECC provides the same level security of 1024-bit RSA public key cryptosystem [71] ); output (message digest) of one-way hash function h(x): 160 bits; 128-bit ciphertext for 128-bit plaintext block using symmetric encryption/decryption (using AES-128) [72] . We calculate the communication costs for the proposed scheme as follows. The message M 1 = {A, SPWx, EIDx, ID HA , Q x } needs (160 + 160 + ( 160/128 ) × 128 + 160 + 320) = 1056 bits. Other messages M 2 = {A, EIDx, Q x , EY , ID FA }, M 3 = {E[SPW , EYh, authToken] K yHA } and M 4 = {EYh, cert} need (160+( 160/128 )×128+320+( 320/128 )×128+160) = 1280 bits, ( (160 + 384 + 160)/128 ) × 128 = 768 bits and ( 320/128 ) × 128 + 160 = 544 bits, respectively. Thus, in total, the proposed scheme needs (1056 + 1280 + 768 + 544) = 3648 bits, that is, 456 bytes. We can observe the proposed scheme has a significantly lower communication cost as compared to the schemes [33] , [67] , [68] , but it has slightly higher than that of the schemes [29] , [31] , and [32] . This is justified as the proposed scheme offers better security and functionality features as compared to other existing schemes (see Table 7 ).
Finally, Table 7 compares the functionality and security features of the proposed scheme along with other schemes. It is apparent that the proposed scheme provides better security, user anonymity and overall more functionality features as compared to other schemes.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this article, we contended that with the ever increasing thrust into monitoring and tracking by government agencies, user anonymity should not dependent on the infallibility of the service provider (HA). To this goal, we presented a new anonymous user authentication scheme for roaming in global mobility networks. The proposed authentication scheme allows authentication for both cases: 1) when the MU is in a foreign network and 2) when the MU is in his/her home network. The proposed scheme supports a group formation of n mobile users. In addition, the proposed scheme provides the integrity check of the group credentials, password update, smart card re-issue when the smart card of the MU is lost or compromised. Through the BAN logic analysis, we demonstrated that the proposed scheme provides mutual authentication between a mobile user and the foreign/home agent. Further, through informal security analysis, we showed the resistance to various known attacks of the proposed scheme. Additionally, we simulated the proposed scheme using the widely accepted AVISPA tool and the simulation results assure that the scheme is safe. The comparative analysis shows that there is a better trade-off among the computation and communication costs, and security and functionality features among the proposed scheme and other schemes. Overall, the proposed scheme allows the group formation procedure for the mobile users and other features that are not supported by the previous existing schemes. VANGA 
